PERSONAL LAW
In Aznar v. Christensen-Garcia, Edward E. Christensen left a part of his property in the Philippines to his acknowledged daughter, Maria Helen Christensen, in his will. Although he was a citizen of the US and California, he was living in the Philippines when he died. Lucy, his other child, claimed that according to California Law, acknowledged children cannot inherit. However, Helen argued that since there is no American law on the disposition of property located in the domicile of the deceased, the State of California Law should apply. She referred to Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which states that personal property follows the law of the owner’s domicile. Furthermore, the validity of the testamentary provision should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines, according to the doctrine of the renvoi.
As to whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi applies, the Supreme Court held that it applies in this case. This doctrine is used when there is a conflict of law and a court needs to consider the law of another state, which is also known as private international law rules. This can happen when dealing with foreign issues that arise in succession planning and estate administration.
Under Article 16 par. 2 of the Civil Code, the national law of the deceased regulates intestate and testamentary successions with regard to the order of succession and amount of successional right. However, the California Probate Code allows a testator to dispose of their property in the manner they choose. Additionally, Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California states that if there is no law to the contrary, the law of the domicile of the deceased person will govern the personal property located in that place.
These provisions are situations where the Doctrine of Renvoi can be applied. It means that the question of the validity of the testamentary provision will be referred back to the decedent’s domicile – the Philippines. The conflicts of law rule in California Law Probate and Art. 946 authorize the return of the question of law to the testator’s domicile. If the court doesn’t apply its own rule in the Philippines, as directed in the conflicts of law rule in California, the case will not be resolved.
The Supreme Court concluded that the domicile of the deceased, Christensen, who was a citizen of California, is the Philippines. Thus, the validity of the provisions in his will, which deprived his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by Philippine law, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, and not by the internal law of California.
In Llorente v. CA, Lorenzo N. Llorente married Paula Llorente, but they later divorced due to her infidelity. After the divorce, Lorenzo became a naturalized American citizen and married his second wife Alice, with whom he had three children. Lorenzo made a will in the Philippines, leaving his property there to his second wife and three children. When Lorenzo died, Paula claimed that she was still his spouse and that the divorce was not valid in the Philippines. The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce was valid in the Philippines because the policy against absolute divorces only applies to Philippine nationals, as stated in Article 15 of the Civil Code. Foreign nationals may obtain divorces in their own countries as long as it is recognized as valid according to their national law. As Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn case applied, and Paula lost her right to inherit from him. Therefore, the divorce obtained by Lorenzo from Paula was recognized in the Philippines as a matter of comity.
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY RELATIONS
In Adong v. Chong Seng Gee, Cheong Boo, a Chinese national, died in Zamboanga, Philippines in 1919 without leaving a will, leaving behind a property worth almost P100,000. The estate was claimed by two parties, Cheong Seng Gee, who claimed to be the legitimate child of Cheong Boo and Tan Dit, and Mora Adong, who claimed to have been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippines, and had two daughters, Payang and Rosalia. The court ruled that Cheong Seng Gee should share in the estate as a natural child, but the marriage between Mora Adong and Cheong Boo could not be recognized under Philippine law. Therefore, the daughters, Payang and Rosalia, would inherit as natural children, and the estate would be partitioned among the three natural children.
The court also ruled that the alleged Chinese marriage was not sufficiently proven and could not be recognized in the Philippines. However, the Mohammedan marriage between Mora Adong and Cheong Boo, performed according to the Moro customs and religion, was valid and recognized under Philippine law. The court found that the public policy leaned towards legalizing matrimony, and the legislative power had the right to remove impediments to effectual marriage. Section IX of the Marriage Law served as a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages.
The court regarded the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage and validated it according to section IX of the Marriage Law. Denying the validity of such marriages would have far-reaching disastrous consequences and go against the settled governmental policy.
Tales and Renaissance 