Eduardo, petitioner herein, filed with RTC Pasay for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father (Joaquin) who died intestate. Joaquin had two marriages in his lifetime. He married Lucia, with children Jesus, Milagros, and Jose who is survived by his three children Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa. Two years after Lucia’s death, Joaquin married the mother of petitioners Eduardo and Sebastian and Mercedes, Caridad.
Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements. The said had been leased and improved by Joseph, respondent.
The respondent also alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia, and upon Lucia’s death, they became the pro indiviso owners.
The RTC ordered that considering the bulk of the estate property was acquired during the existence of the second marriage as shown by the TCTs which showed on its face that the decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted for by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs thereunder.
However, its subsequent resolution declared that the real properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia, which the CA affirmed.
Issue
Does the probate court have the power to determine the ownership of the property in question?
Ruling
Yes. As a general rule, the trial court, as a probate or an intestate court, has jurisdiction only to the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
But is subject to exceptions, first, when the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property is without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action, second, when the interested parties are all heirs, and lastly, determination of the status of each heir, and whether the property in the said inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
In Aznar v. Christensen-Garcia, Edward E. Christensen left a part of his property in the Philippines to his acknowledged daughter, Maria Helen Christensen, in his will. Although he was a citizen of the US and California, he was living in the Philippines when he died. Lucy, his other child, claimed that according to California Law, acknowledged children cannot inherit. However, Helen argued that since there is no American law on the disposition of property located in the domicile of the deceased, the State of California Law should apply. She referred to Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which states that personal property follows the law of the owner’s domicile. Furthermore, the validity of the testamentary provision should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines, according to the doctrine of the renvoi.
As to whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi applies, the Supreme Court held that it applies in this case. This doctrine is used when there is a conflict of law and a court needs to consider the law of another state, which is also known as private international law rules. This can happen when dealing with foreign issues that arise in succession planning and estate administration.
Under Article 16 par. 2 of the Civil Code, the national law of the deceased regulates intestate and testamentary successions with regard to the order of succession and amount of successional right. However, the California Probate Code allows a testator to dispose of their property in the manner they choose. Additionally, Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California states that if there is no law to the contrary, the law of the domicile of the deceased person will govern the personal property located in that place.
These provisions are situations where the Doctrine of Renvoi can be applied. It means that the question of the validity of the testamentary provision will be referred back to the decedent’s domicile – the Philippines. The conflicts of law rule in California Law Probate and Art. 946 authorize the return of the question of law to the testator’s domicile. If the court doesn’t apply its own rule in the Philippines, as directed in the conflicts of law rule in California, the case will not be resolved.
The Supreme Court concluded that the domicile of the deceased, Christensen, who was a citizen of California, is the Philippines. Thus, the validity of the provisions in his will, which deprived his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by Philippine law, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, and not by the internal law of California.
In Llorente v. CA, Lorenzo N. Llorente married Paula Llorente, but they later divorced due to her infidelity. After the divorce, Lorenzo became a naturalized American citizen and married his second wife Alice, with whom he had three children. Lorenzo made a will in the Philippines, leaving his property there to his second wife and three children. When Lorenzo died, Paula claimed that she was still his spouse and that the divorce was not valid in the Philippines. The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce was valid in the Philippines because the policy against absolute divorces only applies to Philippine nationals, as stated in Article 15 of the Civil Code. Foreign nationals may obtain divorces in their own countries as long as it is recognized as valid according to their national law. As Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn case applied, and Paula lost her right to inherit from him. Therefore, the divorce obtained by Lorenzo from Paula was recognized in the Philippines as a matter of comity.
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY RELATIONS
In Adong v. Chong Seng Gee, Cheong Boo, a Chinese national, died in Zamboanga, Philippines in 1919 without leaving a will, leaving behind a property worth almost P100,000. The estate was claimed by two parties, Cheong Seng Gee, who claimed to be the legitimate child of Cheong Boo and Tan Dit, and Mora Adong, who claimed to have been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippines, and had two daughters, Payang and Rosalia. The court ruled that Cheong Seng Gee should share in the estate as a natural child, but the marriage between Mora Adong and Cheong Boo could not be recognized under Philippine law. Therefore, the daughters, Payang and Rosalia, would inherit as natural children, and the estate would be partitioned among the three natural children.
The court also ruled that the alleged Chinese marriage was not sufficiently proven and could not be recognized in the Philippines. However, the Mohammedan marriage between Mora Adong and Cheong Boo, performed according to the Moro customs and religion, was valid and recognized under Philippine law. The court found that the public policy leaned towards legalizing matrimony, and the legislative power had the right to remove impediments to effectual marriage. Section IX of the Marriage Law served as a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages.
The court regarded the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage and validated it according to section IX of the Marriage Law. Denying the validity of such marriages would have far-reaching disastrous consequences and go against the settled governmental policy.
I. GUN OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION IN THE PHILIPPINES
Ownership and/or possession of firearms in the Philippines is a mere privilege; therefore, is not a matter of right.[2] It is contrary to the policy adopted by the US, wherein the Second Amendment of the US Constitution protects Americans’ right to bear arms. As quoted by Justice Leonen, in the Philippines, “There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the ownership or possession of a firearm a property right. Persons intending to use a firearm can only either accept or decline the government’s terms for its use.”[3]
One of the present and principal laws in firearm regulation in the country is Republic Act (RA) No. 10591, also known as “Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act” which was enacted into law, along with its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)’s approval in 2013.
II. SUMMARY OF THE CASE
The petitioners who are licensed gun owners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10591. The statute regulates the ownership and possession of firearms and ammunitions by private individuals., as well as manufacturing, dealing, and etc.; RA 10591 and its IRR regulates ownership and possession by setting qualifications and processes.
It was raised before the Supreme Court for its violation of the right to bear arms on the grounds of requiring license to own and operate a firearms and violation of Article III Section 2 of the Constitution which provides the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
As for the Court, it was reiterated, as in the case of Chavez, that the right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The maintenance of peace and order and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties.[4] However, the grant of license is without prejudice to the inviolability of the home. The signing of Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection is a violation of Article III Section 2 of the Constitution. What is of supreme importance is the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. And the government, in the guise of regulation, cannot conduct inspections of applicants for firearm licenses unless armed with a search warrant.[5]
III. REASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE TO CAP ABUSE
In Caballes v. CA, the Court discussed the parameters for giving a valid consent to search one’s home, that the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. A consent to a must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. In the determination of such evidence, the characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment must be given perusal, to wit: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.[6]
And in requiring a waiver in the pro forma Individual Application for New Firearm Registration, the Philippine National Police appears to recognize the inviolability of the home. Nevertheless, signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection does not result in a true and valid consented search. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10591 and its corresponding provision in the Implementing Rules are unconstitutional for being violative of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The Court extensively discussed Section 9 of the subject statute authorizing warrantless inspections of houses is unreasonable and, hence, requires a search warrant. It was considered overbroad as it failed to provide the scope and limitations of the inspections.
IV. ERADICATING GUN VIOLENCE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Indeed, there is a need to put a stricter regulation of individual firearm ownership and possession in the country. The Philippines has gained a lot of negative reputation, and one of it is gun violence.[7] In 2016, every day in the newspapers are people being killed;[8] it may be committed by an unknown assailant, a uniformed personnel, or a private individual who either has intention or lost calm. However, it must be crucial as well that any person not be put at disadvantaged, such as violating their protection against unreasonable searches and seizures without warrant.
With such decision by the Supreme Court, innocent private individuals—whether an owner or not—are spared from the many possible ways that the uniformed men may abuse their authority. For example, uniformed personnel may just enter into the private home of an individual who may be an owner or not, to threaten; and if not, the latter may be planted with evidence, like in the number of cases in the country.[9]
Lastly, as William Pitt once said, “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.”
[1] UST Faculty of Civil Law, 2G, UST Law Review Understudy
I. CONSTITUTION ON CONGRESS POWER TO EXTEND MARTIAL LAW
The Congress has the power, granted by the 1987 to shorten or extend the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This supported by the pertinent part in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which states that the Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
II. CONGRESSIONAL CHECK
The President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216, which declares a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives were asked by the President to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, or for such period as the Congress may determine. In a joint session, the Senate and the House of Representatives, adopted the resolution further extending the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year.
The Court ruled that the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension power consists of first, the power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or suspension. Such review is “automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is made.” The Congress’ decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension[2] and cannot be set aside by the President. Second, the power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the President’s initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
Such extension of the proclamation or suspension, when approved by the Congress, the becomes a “joint executive and legislative act” or a “collective judgment” between the President and the Congress.
III. GRANTED TO TOLL ABUSE OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S ARMED FORCES
The Congress was granted the power to shorten or extend the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the 1987 Constitution, particularly expressed on Section 18, Article VII. Unlike under the 1935[3] and 1973[4] Constitutions, the Congress had no power to review or limit the Executive’s exercise of the authority to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Due to the country’s martial law experience under the Marcos regime, such power was subsequently established in the 1987 Constitution as part of a system of checks and balance designed to forestall any potential abuse of an extraordinary power lodged in the President as Commander-in- Chief of the country’s armed forces.
IV. MORE REASONABLE AND WEIGHED
The Philippines, at present, following the global order in pursuit of both economic security and security of the State, is still based on several myths, one of is that such can mainly be pursued through military means, which explains the astronomical budgets allocated to it. [5] As a result, incidentally have also contributed to a significant number of abuses by the uniformed, such as during Marcos regime, and currently, more so under Duterte’s administration. [6]
This recent case shall render a cap on the possible abuses of the power vested on the President as regards the armed forces as the Congress has the review the President’s proclamation and to approve any extension beforehand.
[1] UST Faculty of Civil Law, 2G, UST Law Review Understudy
[3] Section 10, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1935 Constitution states: “The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law.”
[4] Section 12, Article IX (The Prime Minister and the Cabinet) of the 1973 Constitution reads: “The Prime Minister shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires, it he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.”
Tales and Renaissance 